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Abstract 
 
Considerable debate exists, in both academic and policy circles, about the utility of the 
European Union (EU) as a model for regional integration schemes elsewhere. While 
discussions of this sort remain interesting and important, they frequently run into the 
problem of the EU’s specificity, which in turn hinders our capacity to make 
generalisations based upon the experience of European integration. In this paper, we 
think slightly differently about the relationship between the EU and the global political 
economy through the exploration of two distinct, but related, sets of questions. The first 
bundle of issues surrounds the EU’s ‘balance of trade’ in various policy methodologies. 
Following Helen Wallace, we examine the ways in which the deployment of various 
styles of governance (including the classical ‘Monnet method’) have impacts upon or 
relate to the practices of economic governance elsewhere. The second set of questions 
emerge from the issue of ‘actorness’ in a global polity and the place that entities such as 
the EU might play in such a world order. In particular, we examine the politics of 
recognition in the global polity and a series of questions relating to the prerequisites for 
action in a globalised world.  
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Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. Imperfect 
though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given the necessary 
institutional reforms it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I 
believe we can make a convincing case that it would also work globally (Romano 
Prodi, 31 March 2000) 
 
There is in effect now more of 'the world' in Europe than of Europe in the world 
(Zaki Laïdi 1998: 82-83) 
 
Does Europe really have any collective sense of how it can and should stand up 
for the principles and ideas that (with American help) shaped our current destiny? 
Do we have in Europe any remaining value driven vision of the world? (Chris 
Patten 1999: 324-325)  
 
 
Introduction 
This paper is about the European Union and or perhaps in the global polity. The choice of 
‘in’ rather than ‘and’ promises to take the argument in a very particular direction3. At the risk 
of indulging in semantic excess, the idea of the European Union (EU) in the global polity 
invites us to think outwards from the EU. It invites us to contemplate issues such as the role 
of regional integration schemes in an evolving system of global governance or the capacity of 
organisations such as the EU to exercise ‘actorness’ in world politics. It might involve 
inverting the problem and thinking about how the development of a global polity might 
influence European integration or shape patterns of European governance within and among 
the member-states of the EU. In carries the connotation that we are dealing with separate 
spheres of action when we discuss the global polity and the EU – that one impacts upon the 
other or that the latter constitutes itself within the former. 
 
And, we suggest, connotes something rather different. The emphasis here is on the evolving 
EU as part of the emerging global polity. So rather than seeing ‘the global polity’ or 
‘globalisation’ as exogenous stimuli, the EU’s complex system of governance might be 
thought of as an expression of these phenomena, albeit mediated through the relatively long-
standing institutions of European integration. Instead of looking outwards, the use of and 
invites us to look inwards at the EU and to think about the shape and scope of its regime(s) of 
governance. The danger of not looking inwards is bound up with the peculiarly complex and 
sui generis character of the EU, something that can go missing in attempts to view the EU 
                                                           
3 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a European Forum Seminar hosted by the Robert Schuman 
Centre at the European University Insitute, Florence.  The authors are grateful to the organisers for this 
opportunity. 
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through an IPE-like lens (Wallace 1994). While there are interesting and important parallels 
between the reinvigoration of European integration from the mid-1980s and the growth of the 
so-called ‘new regionalism’ from the same period, it is important to remember that the EU 
remains formally and informally rather distinct. In formal terms the EU has greater longevity. 
It arose within a specific set of historical circumstances that help to account for a second 
aspect of its formal distinctiveness: its distinct legal-institutional design. Informally, and 
perhaps because of the path dependent consequences of those formal acts of legal-
institutional creativity, the EU has developed into a quite distinctive regime of economic and 
political governance. 
 
In our exploration of Europe's potentials as a regional laboratory for a global polity we 
approach the issue from two perspectives. We begin by looking 'inwards' at the EU polity 
comparing it with the global polity and examining Europe's 'balance of trade' in terms of 
policy modes of governance. In the subsequent section we think 'outwards' from the EU, 
analysing projections of the EU as a new type of actor in a potentially new type of world 
order. Our analysis addresses issue like EU's actorness, recognition politics and changing 
spheres of political action in a globalised world.  
 
 
The EU polity and its modes of governance 
To what extent does the EU supply analysts with guidelines about the evolving nature of the 
global polity. Is it - in essence - an advance indication of the ways in which patterns of 
governance will change? Does the EU’s complex system of governance offer a model for a 
putative global ‘neomedievalism’? More dynamically, does the EU represent a source of 
ideas about complex post-national governance in a globalised era? Nowadays there seems to 
be widespread acknowledgement among Europeanists that the EU is better studied as an 
instance of a political system than as an experiment in regional integration or as an 
international organisation traditionally conceived. The insight here is not new (cf. Lindberg 
1967; Puchala 1972), but it is a view that has come to prominence in EU studies in the past 
decade. To study the EU as ‘integration’ implied that the principal line of political cleavage 
within the EU could be captured by oppositions such as ‘more or less integration’, 
‘intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism’ or ‘nation-state versus super-state’.  
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However, the depth of the EU’s institutionalisation and its wide-ranging issue coverage 
makes it clear that politics within the EU is about much else besides and that not every actor 
engaged in this politics has a concern with  integration outcomes.  
 
Beyond this basic acknowledgement that the EU is a polity of sorts lies considerable 
disagreement. One strategy is to argue that EU politics conforms to the timeless Lasswellian 
notion of politics as ‘who gets what, when, how?’ (Hix 1999). Consequently, the tools 
required for the study of the EU are more or less the tools of normal political science. This 
view regards the discipline of International Relations as largely moribund in this regard 
because it cannot conceive of the EU as a polity and is, at best useful for the investigation of 
the international or systemic stimuli that impact upon actors within the EU system. 
Alternatively the EU can be thought of as occupying several distinct levels of action at which 
different sorts of politics occur. Alternative disciplinary homelands will be appropriate to the 
analysis of each of these levels. A final view is that the ‘Political Science’-‘International-
Relations’ distinction relies on caricatures of both that miss commonalties in terms of the 
sociology of knowledge (Hix 1994, 1996, 1997; Hurrell and Menon 1996, Peterson 1995; 
Ebbinghaus 1998; Rosamond 1999b, 2000 ch. 7). Most agree though that ’EU Studies’ 
traditionally conceived gets stuck in an insoluble sui generis/n = 1 problem which cannot 
generate anything other than primitive, descriptive social science.  
  
These are not just squabbles amongst particular sub-disciplines. They cut to the heart of the 
issue of what the EU is and the extent to which it signifies something distinctive or 
generalisable in the global era. There is no shortage of attempts to encapsulate what the EU 
is. It has been variously  described as a ‘system of multi-level governance’ (Marks, Hooghe 
and Blank 1996), a ‘confederation’ (Warleigh 1998), a ‘confederal consociation 
(Chryssochoou 1994)’, a ‘regime’ (Breckenridge 1997), a ‘political system, but not a state’ 
(Hix 1999), ‘post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent [and] neomedieval’ (Schmitter 1996), 
‘part of a reconfigured pattern of European governance’ (Wallace 2000: 9), a ‘policy-making 
state’ (Richardson 1996), a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1996) and a system of ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism’ (Moravcsik 1998).  
 
Helpful as these characterisations are, any attempt to capture the essence of the EU is likely 
to be partial. The EU has a formal set of institutions and decision-making procedures, but the 
implications of action within that framework reach profoundly into the diverse national 
 6
political systems of the member states. It is fair to say, moreover, that the EU has become 
recently more ‘multi-actor’, ‘multi-level’ and multi-process (Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999). 
Formal mechanisms have been colonised by an array of governmental and non-state actors 
and patterns of informal interaction have become institutionalised. New procedures have been 
devised to take account of the EU’s reach into new areas such as foreign and security policy 
and co-ordination in justice and home affairs, not to mention the realisation of monetary 
union amongst the majority of member states. It has been argued that the existence of 
informalism and ‘subterfuge’ within the EU is the very reason why it is able to escape from 
the gridlock one might expect a 15-country polity to possess (Héretier 1999). 
 
With this in mind and with characteristic clarity, Helen Wallace has recently identified five 
distinctive ‘beasts’ with a ‘shared ecology’ that together make up the EU policy-making 
process (Wallace 2000: xx-xx). The first of these is the classical ‘Monnet method’ of 
supranational-intergovernmental partnership as described at length in most orthodox 
textbooks on the EU. The second is the European regulatory model of ‘negative’ market 
integration and harmonisation through mutual recognition rather than active (interventionist) 
regime-building found most obviously in the construction of the single market. The third is 
the game of distribution and redistribution found in EU policy areas like agriculture and 
structural funding, often captured by the phrase ‘multi-level governance’. The fourth, is the 
accumulation of technical expertise to produce agreed standards and policy norms 
(benchmarking). The fifth Wallace labels ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ and is found in 
areas of high politics that the EU has increasingly colonised.   
 
From the point of view of this paper, perhaps the most interesting issue arising out of 
Wallace’s classification is the relationship between the various co-existent EU policy modes 
and patterns of governance exhibited elsewhere. 
 
Quite clearly, the Monnet or community method is very much a creation of post-war 
European integration. Furthermore, it is a policy mode that finds little obvious application 
elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the classical supranational-intergovernmental model of 
partnership and balance was an idea that came under strain within the Communities from the 
mid-1960s (Wallace 1996). Nevertheless, the classical community method provides the EU 
with its core institutions, ascribes to each powers and functions, and provides mechanisms for 
decision-making. It reflects, in a fundamental way, the institutional choices made in western 
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Europe during the 1950s. Although subsequent treaty revisions have embellished and revised 
the basic formulae of the Treaties of Paris (1950) and Rome (1957) in significant ways, the 
basic template for formal decision-making over the vast majority of policy areas covered by 
the EU remains intact. This has at least two implications. The first, following a historical 
institutionalist line of argument, is that the consequences of these institutional choices are 
reflected in path dependencies. Institutional purposes ‘lock in’, especially in situations where 
the institutions concerned are granted autonomy - and this often induces a divergence 
between institutional outcomes and the founding motivations of their authoritative designers. 
But the range of possible pathways and outcomes is circumscribed by the conditions of 
institutional choice. This means that new challenges or circumstances are not engaged in 
terms of an institutional tabula rasa (Pierson 1998). Moreover, secondly, the formalities built 
into the chosen institutional pattern have spawned around them complex and sophisticated 
processes, which although strictly informal have become institutionalised and thus in turn 
help to contribute to the longevity of the basic institutional framework (Sherrington 2000). As 
Peterson and Bomberg note, the EU has developed a series of decision-making norms over 
time that ‘govern exchanges within and between EU institutions, and define the acceptable 
parameters for political action by agents in decision-making’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 
53).4  
 
Thus from the viewpoint of the EU, one conclusion to draw is that the institutional conditions 
under which Europeans have encountered the challenge of ‘globalisation’ have been very 
distinctive and quite unlike those faced by other regions. The Monnet/community model 
arose out of institutional choices made in quite specific temporal, strategic and epistemic 
contexts. So while it is perfectly possible to argue that much recent policy innovation and 
formal integration has represented some sort of adjustment to global market imperatives, it is 
equally important to understand that European integration and the Europeanisation of 
economic governance might equally be thought of as playing out a set of decidedly internal 
logics.  
 
For example, the initiative to complete the single market amongst the member states that 
arose in the mid-1980s was, in many ways, a clear attempt to realise the aspirations of the 
                                                           
4 They identify the following norms as being particularly central: the use of ‘soft law’, ‘negotiated enforcement’, 
‘waiting for a policy window’, ‘punctuated equilibriums’, package dealing’, ‘subsidiarity’, informal decision-
making’ and ‘consensus at (almost) any cost’. 
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Treaty of Rome to create a common market after years of relative stagnation. To an extent the 
Single European Act can be read as an attempt to fulfil some of the functionalist calculus of 
the Communities’ founders (where the achievement of a common market would be the latest 
stage along a route to full economic and thus political integration).5 Moreover, the 
institutional methodology chosen was a more efficient version of the classical community 
method. Finally, there is a good deal of evidence to back the view that the single market 
programme had much to do with a renewed sense of institutional purpose within the 
European Commission under Jacques Delors.6   
 
Also the encroachment of the EU into many new areas of regulation and policy competence 
can be explained less by the impact of external stimuli and more by the playing out of the 
EU’s ‘everyday politics’. The accumulating jurisprudence and judicial activism of the 
European Court of Justice is important here, as is the adroit use of Treaty provisions by the 
Commission to colonise new policy areas such as the environment and to gain a toe hold in 
others such as social policy.  
 
All of this suggests that the EU’s development and present trajectory has much to do with the 
resolution of internal games and the playing out of institutionally-embedded logics. It is quite 
clear, moreover, that the model of institutionalised integration represented by the EU has 
been deliberately avoided by designers of regional orders elsewhere. Even if European 
integration has been a stimulus to other collective endeavours both during the 1960s and in 
the present period (Mattli 1999), there has been little inclination globally to either (a) go 
beyond the construction of free trade zones or (b) create active supranational institutions.  
The Community method has not been a successful European export to the global polity, but it 
remains a significant reference point for more or less any discussion about regional 
integration (if only in a negative sense).  
  
                                                           
5 If anything this highlights the significance of the epistemic foundations of the Communities. There is quite a 
striking similarity between the strategies employed by the institutional designers of the Communities, the 
models of integration being developed by economists at the time and the growth of neofunctionalist theories of 
political integration (see Rosamond 2000 ch. 3).  
6 This argument should not be pushed too far though. Powerful arguments have also been advanced to suggest 
that the single market project was facilitated by a neo-liberal preference convergence among the key member 
states (Moravcsik 1991). Others look to the development of pressures from powerful non-state corporate actors 
increasingly operating in transnational economic space who came to make demands for a rule-bound 
transnational order and to forge alliances with stragtically-minded quarters of the European Commission (see 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). Moreover, the governance of the single market conforms more readily to the 
regulatory policy mode. 
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In contrast Wallace’s second policy mode, the EU regulatory model, is widely imitated. This 
involves the achievement of ‘negative integration’, that is the removal of barriers to market 
efficiency and factor mobility combined with the management of economic interaction 
through regulation rather than traditional command and control mechanisms.  The literature 
on the regulatory state suggests that this policy mode has been historically most embedded in 
the governance of the American economy (Majone 1991, 1994, 1996). In contrast, twentieth 
century Western Europe has been characterised by an emphasis on the redistribution and 
stabilisation functions of the state. The growth of regulation as a policy mode in Europe 
coincides with (a) the growth of the EU and (b) perceptions of the need to rectify market 
failures in light of international competitive threats. Regulation has two primary attractions in 
the EU context. First, it is cheap. The EU’s budget accounts for about 1.2 per cent of total 
Community GNP and vast swathes of the budget are used to finance the Common 
Agricultural Policy and structural funding – both more obviously redistributive than 
regulatory policies (Laffan and Shackleton 2000).7 Second, regulation fits well with the 
dominant neo-liberal ideational framework of most European policy-makers. Also, as both 
Wallace and Majone note, Europeanising regulation is a potentially useful way for national 
policy-makers to escape rigidities in their domestic contexts. 
 
The Communities were well suited to developing a regulatory policy mode. The single 
market agenda of the mid-1980s required the creation of a common market without fiscal, 
physical, technical or other barriers to the free movement of factors of production. This was 
largely an exercise in negative integration, a tendency reinforced by the establishment of the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’. This meant that EC-wide standardisation would not be 
required. Instead the reciprocal acceptance of existing national standards legislation would in 
itself prevent the erection of barriers to the free movement of goods (Alter and Meunier-
Aitsahalia 1994). Of course, this relies upon the intercession and effective jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice and, in the case of creating the momentum for the spread of 
regulation, an active and strategically-inclined supranational agent (the Commission) 
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 69).  
 
                                                           
7 Laffan and Shackleton cite figures from Agenda 2000 showing that the Commission expects ‘internal policies’ 
(other than agriculture and structural funding) to continue to consume no more than around 6 per cent of the 
budget until 2006 (p.230).    
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In addition to these attractions, Armstrong and Bulmer argue that regulation forced its way 
onto the Communities’ policy-making agenda in the 1980s as a consequence of ‘contagion’. 
This has two senses. The first is the spread of neo-liberal notions of regulation (i.e. 
‘deregulation’ in the sense of dismantling command and control mechanisms and ‘re-
regulation’ in terms of liberalisation under the rule of law). Most obviously this aspect has a 
transatlantic dimension, but it is also clear that – ironically perhaps – the British Conservative 
government under Margaret Thatcher was the most active and aggressive proponent amongst 
the member states of this new regulatory style.8 The second sense of contagion relates to the 
global impact of deregulation in the United States from the late 1970s (Armstrong and 
Bulmer 1998: 9). This might be seen as an explanation for why public authorities in the west 
began to sponsor economic policies consistent with neoliberal globalisation, but it cannot of 
itself account for why in Europe regulation came to be undertaken significantly and 
increasingly at the macro-regional level. 
 
Three sorts of explanation seem to prevail, two ‘rationalist’, one broadly ‘constructivist’. The 
first looks to the preferences of member states and to the domestic context within which those 
preferences were formulated. Demands for supranational regulation come from powerful 
economic groups. Governments conscious of the need to maintain the support of these groups 
and sensitive to the benefits (in terms of autonomy) to be gained from upward delegation tend 
to accede to their demands. Alternatively, economic actors operating in an emergent 
transnational space seek rule-bound orders from pre-existing supranational authorities 
(Sandholz and Stone Sweet 1998). The third view argues that Europeanisation requires the 
discursive construction of the idea of a European economic space and of discernible 
‘European’ economic agents. This is accomplished more often than not through the 
invocation of external economic imperatives that (a) render national modes of economic 
governance obsolescent and (b) require neo-liberal deregulatory responses (Rosamond 
1999a). 
 
Wallace’s third policy mode is multi-level governance (MLG). She uses the term in its 
original and narrow sense to describe the redistributive politics that have emerged in the 
context of the EU. There has always been a redistributive aspect to the activities of the 
Communities. The CAP as a system of agricultural support might be best thought of as a sort 
                                                           
8 This raises complex issues to do with policy transfer and lesson-drawing that cannot be dealt with here. See 
Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Stone 1999. On policy transfer in the EU, see Radaelli 2000.  
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of ‘welfare state for farmers’ and so-called structural funding is the second most expensive 
line item on the EU’s budget. MLG in this sense describes the breakdown of national 
governments’ capacity to ‘gatekeep’ the interactions between their domestic polities and 
supranational institutions as well as the growing politics of sub-national regionalism that 
emerges in this context (Marks 1993; Hooghe 1996). We are forced to expand our conception 
of the EU polity rather well beyond the institutional for a of Brussels and Strasbourg. This 
conception of MLG draws attention not simply to the role in Europeanisation played by 
strategic elements in the Commission, but also to their equivalents working in sub-national 
contexts. It gives us a very firm sense of tiered or layered governance.  
 
In the above sense MLG would seem to be a very European creation – a consequence of 
particular policy innovations and the need to ensure cohesion in the context of deepening 
(and thus potentially displacing) market integration with little application elsewhere. 
However, MLG has come to be used in a more broad-ranging sense as a way of describing 
the EU polity as a whole. Here MLG is used as a metaphor for the non-state-centric, multi-
actor and rather fluid system of governance characterised by multiple loci of public and 
private authority currently evolving in Europe (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Ebbinghaus 
1998; Rosamond 2001a). It has been used to depict the EU as ‘a horizontally as well as 
vertically asymmetrical negotiating system.’ (Christiansen 1997). Gary Marks and his 
colleagues define their approach thus:  
 
The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the 
existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and 
the interaction of political actors across those levels. Member state executives, 
while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity. 
States are not an exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental 
bargaining in the EU. Instead of the two level game assumptions adopted by state, 
MLG theorists posit a set of overarching, multi-level policy networks. The 
structure of political control is variable, not constant, across policy areas (Marks, 
Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996: 41). 
 
Note how MLG in this sense is not so much a description of the EU as a rival perspective to 
the dominant intergovernmental theories. Not only is MLG a less-state centric approach than, 
say, Moravscik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, but it also draws on a rather more pluralistic 
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and organisational conception of the state. This in turn resonates with the idea of the state as 
partially internationalised and permeated in the context of globalisation. In that sense MLG 
might be less EU-specific than at first sight. 
 
The fourth policy mode Wallace describes as ‘policy co-ordination and benchmarking’ which 
she explicitly identifies as an import from the OECD (see OECD, n.d). This technique aims to 
spread ‘best practice’ in policy-making through the accumulation of specialist expertise. In 
the EU this takes places within and beyond the formal institutions where the statistical 
auditing of various aspects of the European economy is now a routine exercise (Lee, 2001). 
Benchmarking is built around the idea that it is possible to isolate those variables that 
contribute to the underperformance of the European economy in relation to (particularly) the 
United States. According to the Commission’s Competitiveness Advisory Group, the 
technique also aspires to find ways of transferring ‘positive’ experiences (Jacquemin and 
Pench, 1997). Benchmarking can operate at the macro level by exploring the issue of 
European competitiveness, but it is also used at the sectoral level.  
 
The EU is well suited to this policy mode. The need for technocratic legitimacy is arguably a 
precondition for the development of European-level action and regulation through expertise 
is might be thought of as a function of pillarised, bureaucratic system (Radaelli, 1999). The 
key issue with benchmarking concerns its lack of formal interventionist or regulatory 
character. It is a policy methodology that operates at the level of the dissemination of 
knowledge and builds on the idea that particular deficiencies in European capitalism can be 
overcome through the reform of practices  at both policy and enterprise level. This may 
indicate a broader preference for the Americanisation of the European economy and the 
inculcation of neo-liberal practices that displace elements of the European social model, 
though it might also reflect the dominance of the policy style of a particular member state – 
the UK – in the development of EU-level industrial policy (Lee 2001). 
 
The final policy mode is ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’. At first sight this would appear to 
be another phenomenon distinctive to the EU. Wallace coins the term to describe the sort of 
politics arising in the context of the EU’s incursion into areas of traditional high politics, 
particularly monetary union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and co-
operation in justice and home affairs (JHA). Regardless of the formal provisions of the TEU, 
the development of EMU and its subsequent enactment has relied on a delicate set of 
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negotiating arrangements involving national governments, finance ministries, central banks 
and the Commission (Dyson 1994; Dyson and Featherstone 1999). CFSP and JHA occupy 
separate ‘pillars’ of the European Union and were constructed to be altogether more 
intergovernmental in character than the ‘core’ areas of economic governance colonised by the 
Communities. Thus the Commission’s wings are severely clipped and neither the European 
Parliament nor the European Court of Justice have significant input into policy-making in 
these areas.  
 
Yet characterising the interactions in these areas as ‘intergovernmental’ in the traditional 
sense is rather misleading. The term suggests that the EU is best conceived of as a forum for 
inter-state bargaining or for the ‘practice of ordinary diplomacy under conditions creating 
unusual opportunities for providing collective goods through highly institutionalized 
exchange’ (Pierson 1996: 124). But close scrutiny of these policy areas reveals something 
rather more complex. For example a straightforward intergovernmentalist analysis would 
miss the emergent rules of the game in the CFSP that underwrite notable processes of 
organisation adaptation and socialisation (Jørgensen 1997). An intensive and complex foreign 
and security policy network seems to have arisen involving substantial cross-fertilisation of 
officials from foreign and defence ministries. Interest groups and supranational institutions do 
not figure, but as Forster and Wallace observe 
 
[s]ome of the classic characteristics of European integration have…been evident 
in this field: the importance of socialization through working together, the 
proliferation of working groups as a basis for policy-making and policy 
implementation, the hierarchy of committees through which ministers and prime 
ministers set general objectives and officials struggle to translate these into 
detailed policies (Forster and Wallace 2000). 
 
If anything co-operative activity in JHA has been rather more sluggish, but the tell-tale signs 
of intensive transgovernmentalism have begun to emerge through innovations such as the 
European Judicial Network (1998) and a developing policy network amongst member states’ 
interior and justice ministries (den Boer and Wallace 2000). The potential significance of 
intensive transgovernmentalism may go beyond its present European homeland. True, it has 
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arisen in policy areas associated with deep integration, but the obvious lack of 
supranationalism makes this a rather more readily exportable model.9  
 
 
Global Projections of the EU  
The acceleration in formal European integration can usually be dated to the mid-1980s and 
the conscious attempt to create the regulatory conditions and a timetable for the establishment 
of a genuine common market amongst the member states. This was followed by the 
provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) contained in the 1992 (Maastricht) 
Treaty on European Union. Both of these initiatives required and were accompanied by 
significant growth in supranational policy competence. The idea that these recent spurts of 
European integration emerged in response to similar stimuli to NAFTA etc is tempting and – 
to a degree at least – plausible, but any suggestion of this sort has to confront the institutional 
longevity of what is now known as the EU. Conventional ‘regionalist’ explanations of the EU 
perhaps also place too great an emphasis on external stimuli for state action.  
 
On the other hand, the literature on the EU addresses significant questions about the extent to 
which regional orders are capable of becoming coherent, actor-like entities within an 
emergent global polity. The question is again one that might only be applicable to the EU for 
similar reasons to those cited in the previous sections. However, the idea that ‘the region’ 
might emerge as a significant type of authoritative unit in world politics is an idea that offers 
a compelling challenge to a number of well-known post-Westphalian world order scenarios. 
 
This runs into serious question of what might constitute ‘actorness’ in the global polity. If our 
initial presumption that the criterion for significance as an actor is bound up with those 
authoritative features traditionally associated with the nation-state, then we are in danger of 
falling into the trap of thinking that the states system can only be replaced or undermined by 
a system populated with entities that are institutionally-substitutable for the state (Ruggie 
1998: 172-92). The problem is that ‘the notion of an international actor is wedded, as least 
historically to the concept of the nation, sovereignty and the broad tenets of realpolitik’ 
(Holland 1996). In that light, it is interesting to note how Europeanists have contributed to the 
                                                           
9 This would be especially true in a scenario where regional elites sought to embark upon a scheme of monetary 
integration rather than taking an orthodox free trade area-customs union-common market-monetary union 
model. See Dieter 2000.  
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idea of what a significant post-national or supranational actor might look like. For example, 
Hill has attempted to conceptualise the EU’s world role by making a distinction between 
‘actorness’ and ‘presence’. Presence requires a discernible EU impact upon international 
relations (Hill’s choice of term) while the former is accomplished where a unit is clearly 
delimited from others, has a legal personality and possesses various structural prerequisites 
for action in the international arena.10 This distinguishes the EU from the conventional state 
and its foreign policy apparatus, but leaves largely unquestioned the nature of the polity it 
inhabits.  
 
This can be thought of as being analytically conservative because if the EU is thought to be a 
manifestation of something new or distinct, then its presence within international society 
should not be assessed according to the norms of the status quo. On the other hand, 
‘actorness’ is not only about the objective existence of dimensions of external presence, but 
also about the subjective aspects embodied in the validation of a collective self by significant 
others (Rosamond 2000: 177; Allen and Smith 1991; Smith 1996). The importance of the 
subjective dimensions of the global polity serve to remind us that the conventional discourse 
of world politics amongst practitioners remains wedded very much to the diplomatic norms 
of the states system. Thus interlopers into the system, such as the EU, seeking legitimacy 
within that system have obvious incentives to present themselves in terms comprehensible by 
other units.11 
 
Writing about developing an ‘organisational approach’ to the study of world politics, 
Friedrich Kratochwil argued that ‘[o]ne implication…is that we must pay attention to the way 
in which the system and the units are co-constitutive of each other. For example the 
emergence of the territorial state and the creation of the European state system occurred 
simultaneously. Sovereignty thus became the most important notion for both domestic and 
international politics’ (1994: xi). Thus in many ways the EU may present itself as a challenge 
to the prevailing norms of the international system, but its relationship with that system will 
be complex and dialectical. Important questions to ask include whether the EU as a 'presence' 
                                                           
10 Richard Whitman (1997) has gone some way to providing a detailed mapping of the realities of the EU’s 
‘actorness’ and presence in the international arena which together help to establish an international identity for 
the EU.  
11 This does of course represent something of a radical analytical departure taking the emphasis away from the 
study of the objective reality of the international system towards the analysis of norms within that system and 
their capacity to sustain themselves (see Shaw and Wiener 2000). 
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simultaneously reflects the emergence of new systemic norms and/or contributes to the 
normalisation of a new form of global polity?   
  
Among these complex and dialectical relations, the issue of recognition belongs to the most 
fundamental. While it is an undeniable fact that the European Union has not been formally and 
fully recognised as a constituent entity of international society, it is equally true that the issue is 
much more complicated than that. Despite the lack of formal de jure recognition, the Union is 
nevertheless playing a prime role in a number of policy areas and in other policy areas a 
considerable role, thus enjoying de facto recognition across a wide spectrum of activities in the 
global polity. Were the European Union to become a state like other states in international 
society then it is likely that recognition would follow immediately. Yet member states of the EU 
have been very reluctant to give up representation, resulting in several cases of 'mixed 
competence'. Thus while the United States need not (any more) engage in international 
recognition politics (concerning itself) - the European Union does. However, most studies of the 
European Union in world politics neglect issues of recognition or register them without 
attributing too much importance to them (for exceptions, see Jupille and Caporaso 1996: 214-16; 
Bretherton and Vogler 1999). In our view this is unfortunate because recognition politics 
constitutes a key dimension of the EU's presence - and problems - in the global polity.  
 
International recognition politics concerns status, symbolic or ceremonial politics, identity 
and, in a word, being an international actor. In a sense, the defining moment of a state is the 
moment when it is recognised by other states and thus becomes a unit in international society, 
consisting simply of the units of the system recognised as states by other states. When the 
European Union is brought into the equation, the increase of complexity is considerable. 
Partly because the European Union requires both 'internal' and 'external' recognition. The 
Union has to be recognised by its member states and without 'domestic' recognition, the 
Union will obviously have a hard time being recognised by others. The varying degree of 
domestic recognition results in a spectrum from fully recognised (for instance trade 
negotiations) to not at all recognised (UN Security Council). Furthermore, recognition has 
both a formal de jure dimension and a de facto dimension. The de jure dimension of 
recognition is of crucial importance. In Charles Taylor's words, ‘the formal trappings of 
sovereignty - the exchange of ambassadors, a seat in the United Nations, and so on - are the 
paramount form of international recognition today’ (Taylor 1993: 53). Yet, precisely formal 
recognition has proved very difficult for the European Union to achieve, in part because 
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Member States have been reluctant to legally transfer competence to the European 
Commission. Without de jure recognition, the Union cannot vote in international fora or sign 
international agreements. In turn, the Union is unable to engage in follow up activities, 
including compliance or non-compliance. Consequently, European institutions lack good 
reasons to establish capacities to handle international affairs. Nevertheless, the Commission 
has been very active in promoting itself as a European player, reaching a possible zenith at 
the UN Earth Summit in Rio when the then President of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors, wished to 'sit at the top table in Rio...as the leader of an essentially sovereign entity 
during the formal signing and concluding ceremonies' (Jupille and Caporaso 1996: 222). 
Concerning informal recognition, Jupille and Caporaso argue that, ‘De facto recognition of 
the EU can result from its instrumentality for third states and from the sociality of global 
politics. Third parties that decided to interact with the EU implicitly confer recognition upon 
it’ (1996: 215). One significant example of active mutual constitution at play is the 'rush to 
Brussels' when the Single Market project had been launched, i.e. the choice of most third 
states to accredit their delegation also to the European Community and not only to Belgium. 
 
International recognition is sometimes more than an issue of formality. It can just as well be 
linked to identity. In Taylor's words, ‘it becomes very important that we be recognised for 
what we are’ (1993:52). So what does the European Union want to be recognised as? We 
begin in an ex negativo mode, noting that the European Union does not want to regarded as 
merely a regime or simply an international organisation. In attempting to arrive at a more 
positive answer, we note that the Union has build up an impressive network of external 
representation. At the European regional level, the EU is cultivating relations with several 
international organisations including the Western European Union, the OSCE, NATO and the 
Council of Europe. This is most unusual for an international organization and hints at the 
Union's qualities as an international actor. At the inter-regional level, the EU is conducting 
dialogue-diplomacy with other regional integration organisations, including ASEAN, the 
GCC and the Mercosur, and a network of intercontinental dialogues like the Asia-Europe and 
Europe-Africa Summits has been established (Edwards and Regelsberger 1990; Piening 
1997). Such bilateral relations on a continental scale hints at new forms of global politics, 
though it fair to say that the significance of this new form of politics remains largely 
uncharted. At the global level, the EU has observer status in most UN bodies and belongs to 
the G8 circle. Furthermore, it is indicative that the EU has considerable shares in the creation 
of the WTO, is a full member of FAO and, has a sui generis status in the OECD. Besides 
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these links with international organisations, the European Commission has delegations in 
some 120+ third countries.12 The Union thus aspires to be or become a major international 
player, acting on arenas provided by international organisations and, crucially in the present 
context, the EU has in numerous areas been de facto recognised as such a player.  
 
Given that the Union has been de facto recognised by other actors in the international society 
and that the Union has a significant international presence what does the Union attempt to 
promote internationally? Should the Union be seen as a model? Does the Union have 
'domestic' institutions that can be projected globally? Which key principles, values or visions 
does the Union use to inform its foreign policies? These questions can only be touched 
briefly yet hopefully sufficiently to suggest directions for further research. Reflecting on 
these matters, the present Commissioner for EU external relations, Chris Patten, does not 
provide any clear answers yet sounds somewhat doubtful about the likelihood of European 
leadership. He takes his point of departure in Europe's aspirations ‘because of our history, our 
civilization and our self-approbation we aspire to play some role in the world. But what are we 
for, what do we believe, what are we prepared to do...’, continuing, ‘...what are we prepared as a 
whole in Europe today to risk for the sake of decency and liberty elsewhere?’ (Patten, 1999). 
 
There are good reasons for Patten's agnosticism. After all, even if references to the EU as a 
model for the global polity are legion they have more often than not been rather vague, 
hinting at Europe's status as a security community (forgetting about Cold War security 
dynamics), Europe's achievements in terms of regional integration (neglecting their perhaps 
distinct European relevance) or under-specified European values and principles. During the 
Cold War, 'Europe' was often presented as a 'mediator' or 'third force', more responsible and 
'civilian' than the superpowers. Plausible or not, it is in any case not a model that is relevant 
for the post-Cold War world. In terms of institutional projection, we have at best a mixed 
picture. Thus, the EU has been unable to impact upon institutional designs of international 
organisations like the G8, unable to influence the design of regional organisations like 
Mercosur, the GCC or NAFTA and similarly unable to influence key processes of regional 
integration such as in South East Asia. On the other hand, in terms of developing 
development aid policies (the entire development aid complex), or conducting UN 
                                                           
12 Commission delegations in EU Member States belong to a different category. 
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peacekeeping operations, Europe has contributed a distinct approach and thus informed the 
part of the global polity that is the UN.  
 
 
The EU and Politics in the Global Polity 
The final issue to consider is what all this means for the form of politics we should expect in 
a global polity? The image of changing boundaries of the political seems highly relevant for an 
adequate understanding of processes of globalization of politics. At least three options seem 
relevant: 
 
•= the disappearance of politics  
•= the reappearance of politics  
•= the appearance of global politics 
 
It should be remembered that European integration for decades was a political project that 
attempted strenuously  to dissociate itself from traditional (power) politics. Due to extremely bad 
experiences with unbound political forces during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, the launch of the 
integration process was informed by a desire to transform politics into 'non-politics'. Hence 
David Mitrany's plea for 'functional' agencies and the technocratic character of the Monnet 
method. In Kahler's apt words, ‘For the functionalists, the enemy was high politics - source of 
Europe's bloody civil wars in this century - and the goal was political federation’ (1987: 299-
300). The emphasis of Monnet and Haas on processes of engrenage or functional spillover 
points in the same direction, though with some space left for politics. Hence the specific design 
of the political superstructure of the Euro-polity: a relatively weak parliament, an intended 
strong supranational (read a-political) institution like the European Commission, and, originally, 
a modest role for the Council of Ministers. The European project has thus always been political 
yet presented as apolitical and employing (neo-)functional means. 
 
When analysing the possible disappearance of politics, we note the argument that international 
organisations and also the European Union, intended or unintended, represent de-politicized 
national politics. According to Kahler, ‘High politics ceased to be politics...[S]trategic policy 
was sterilised politically and insulated bureaucratically. Ironically, that triumph of technocracy 
sought by many in the construction of a United Europe could be discovered instead in the 
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reduced sphere of high politics’ (1987: 289). Thus, politics has somehow become technocratic 
social action, limited to persons who represent states, corporate interests or other types of 
interest groups, meeting in global hubs for the purpose of social management. In the case of the 
European Union, this process has even become squared, in the sense that first we have the 
transfer of politics from national spheres to the European level and then, in turn, the Union 
represents the member states at the level of the global polity. With the growing role of interna-
tional organisations in the global polity, politics has therefore not been globalized, politics has 
disappeared. Besides adding to complexity, the Union does not disturb the argument because 
both the Union and the global polity can be regarded as instances of a global process leading to 
de-politicisation of social action. Politics has declined if not disappeared. Instead of public 
politics, we see private or corporate actors or politics has been transferred to the structural forces 
of the economy, i.e. to the market.  
 
Second, the disappearance of politics option may in some sense well be true but the political has 
not disappeared entirely. According to one version of the argument, there are 'pockets' of politi-
cal activity around in the OECD world but this type of social action has become marginalised 
and squeezed into the streets of Seattle or Prague. Concern about marginalized political activity 
can be left with the police departments of major cities around the world, serving as meeting 
places for the de-territorialised global polity. According to another version of the argument, if 
the political ever disappeared it has now reappeared, albeit in a new key. Only politics 
concerning socio-economic interests has disappeared, politics as such has survived or 
reappeared, yet because socio-economic politics has been taken off the political agenda, the 
political deals now with ethnic or cultural issues or, reappearing under the rubric of 'the national'. 
Because politics went global and became a-political, the local and national has been left to 
somebody else. In this way the two first options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both 
images may well be very accurate descriptions of the current state of affairs.  
 
According to the third option, politics has neither disappeared nor reappeared. Instead, through 
the process of going global, it has been dispersed and has definitely assumed new forms. Politics 
is not what it used to be. In the words of David Held et al., "Globalization is not bringing about 
the death of politics. It is re-illuminating and reinvigorating the contemporary political terrain 
(1999: 496). The emergence of global politics is another word of saying that politics to some 
degree has left national boundaries behind and that also 'international politics' is no longer a fully 
adequate concept. In other words, politics is social action unfolding at several levels and 
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including different kind of actors. Politics is no more a domain reserved for national politicians 
or parties. Corporate actors engage in global politics just as well as global non-profit interest 
groups, epistemic communities, or officials employed by international organisations. In short, 
the increasingly important role of the global level of political deliberation is accompanied with 
new forms of politics, cultivated by new kinds of actors, using novel means of communication. 
This description is strikingly similar to one interpretation of what is going on inside the 
European Union, where the political has been differentiated into several levels, i.e. the multi-
level governance model in which politics in the Euro-polity has been added to politics in 
existing polities, constituting simply European Union politics. 
 
 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of the paper we claimed that any discussion of the EU in relation to the 
global polity requires a lengthy preface about the emergence of a putative ‘EU polity’. 
Instead of arguing our case from just one perspective, we opted for two. One is to think about 
the EU as a polity and to explore, crudely, the ‘balance of trade’ of modes of governance. 
Drawing on Wallace’s classification is helpful because we can think about the various policy 
modes in a global context and get some sense of what is going on within the EU polity in 
relation to developments in the wider world. The picture that emerges is far from one of the 
EU pursuing its own path dependent logic in isolation from developments in governance 
elsewhere. The import and export of policy styles and modes of governance is evident. To 
argue that the EU provides nothing in the way of a model for the global polity relies upon a 
rather outdated conception of how the EU operates. This view is rather distracted by the 
formal institutional manifestations of the EU and less attentive to the growth of less Treaty 
bound and more informal policy developments. The in-route gives us a decent idea of the 
sheer complexity of how EU policy-making is adapting itself, to both exogenous and 
endogenous (or path dependent) stimuli. But it also shows why the EU is a useful venue for 
the exploration ideas about governance as well as the practice of governance in a globalised 
era. The second perspective is to explore the external projection of the EU as a new type of 
actor in a potentially new type of world order. The presence of the EU in the latter may be 
constitutive of the global polity making it compulsory to include the EU in any serious 
discussion of the global polity. But equally, we should think about the ways in which the 
global polity (or for that matter the residue of the pre-global polity) impacts upon the EU. 
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The paper has demonstrated how the development of both the EU polity and the global polity 
are closely intertwined. Yet the paper also suggest that research on the global polity can 
benefit significantly from research on European integration. Indeed, if discussions about the 
global polity are largely about emergent ‘post-national’ forms of governance then debates 
about European integration may have prefigured these by at least 30 years. On the other hand 
any discussions of the European dimensions of the global polity need to take account of the 
awkward fact that the development of institutions of integration and economic governance 
have been in place and developing for a long period. So the various pressures that occasion 
the appearance of the ‘global polity’ do not strike the EU as a ‘green field’ site. 
 
Finally, the appearance of both an EU polity and a ‘global polity’ is suggestive of change 
from established patterns of world order. It conveys a sense that world politics is becoming 
more ‘organised’ and, therefore, less anarchic. In terms of order this takes us away from the 
system of anarchy that formed the basis of the classical Westphalian system. In terms of units 
it implies a multiplication of numbers and types of significant actors in the system. In terms 
of processes, it suggests that world politics is as much about transnational, trans-societal and 
post-territorial relations as it is about inter-national or intergovernmental forms of interaction. 
The latter continue to exist, but as part of a wider and more complex web of social relations. 
This also means that authority is more widely dispersed and more prone to reside beyond the 
grasp of formal public institutions, hence the phrase ‘governance without government’. 
Analytically, this all suggests that we should be less state-centric and analytically more 
multidisciplinary. The global polity might be thought of as the political expression of 
economic globalisation, or, as perhaps a form of complex institutional adaptation or response 
where patterns of governance shift in response to changed structural realities, or, as a set of 
mechanisms designed to promote further globalisation or simply part and parcel of the new 
globalised political economy. 
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